Review: Barrel-Aged Stout and Selling Out

I first caught wind of Josh Noel's book months ago. It peaked my interest because I've followed the antics of Anheuser-Busch in craft beer space for many years. You know this if you stop by here occasionally. I preordered the book on Amazon and it arrived just prior to last week's trip to Kauai. Perfect timing.

The book is not yet in full release. That evidently happens on June 1. It looks like Amazon is still handling it as a preorder, though, as I say, the copy I ordered months ago arrived in my mailbox about two weeks ago. Whatever.

First, I don't know Josh Noel and was not interviewed for his book. One of my blog posts from several years ago is referenced, but that's it. My friend, Jeff Alworth, received an advance copy a while ago and told me it was great reading. He was right, a rarity. (I kid.) Read Jeff's review here.

Noel, who writes about beer and travel for the Chicago Tribune, interviewed seemingly hundreds of people and consulted a pile of print, electronic and related sources while prepping for the book. As with all such projects, the research likely took significantly longer than the actual writing. Situation normal.

I don't want to give too much of the book away. Please support the author by purchasing a copy. The tale is essentially divided into two parts. Most of the first half of the book focuses on how John and Greg Hall (father and son) built Goose Island Brewing into a highly respected craft brand. The second half covers the aftermath of Goose Island's sale to Anheuser-Busch in 2011.

It's clear early on that John and Greg Hall are polar opposites. John is the steady, conservative hand steering the company; Greg is the wildly creative, undisciplined and unstable force who invented a great line of beers, including Bourbon County Stout, a beer that transformed the way we think about barrel beer in this country.

By 2010 or so, Goose Island was at a crossroads. It simply could not keep up with the demand for its mainstream beers, while also maintaining production of its high end specialty beers. They needed money in some form to expand. John Hall, 45 when he launched the brewery, was nearly 70. Thinking about the next 10 or 20 years wasn't in the cards.

There was no succession plan at Goose Island. While many employees and outsiders assumed Greg Hall would eventually take control of the company, that was not the plan. Some will consider Greg to be the tragic figure in this story. In fact, it's fairly clear that he was was not suited by temperament to run the company. He was strictly a creative guy.

The result of that reality is that John Hall elected to sell a controlling share in Goose Island to Anheuser-Busch. Portland-based Craft Brew Alliance, which owned a 42 percent share in Goose, eventually sold its share for $16 million in cash, plus reduced distribution fees worth millions more (the CBA was a third owned by AB at the time).

In the wake of the buyout, Noel shifts to covering multiple facets of what transpired. The Brazilians running Anheuser-Busch (absorbed by InBev prior to the Goose Island deal) had no idea how to operate a craft brewery. They bullied employees, bungled marketing tactics and generally mangled the Goose Island brand.

But Goose Island served as a sort of test case. As Anheuser-Busch bought more craft breweries, its experience at Goose was significant. The cautionary tale for craft beer fans is that the Brazilians have been good learners. They've modified and refined their approach with the acquired brands. To a significant extent, they actually know what they're doing now.

It seems to me that Noel's views on big beer vs craft are readily apparent. But you'll have to read the book and judge for yourself. If you care about the beer industry and the future of craft beer, you'll enjoy this book. Please buy of copy at your local independent bookstore or online, if you must. It's well-worth the investment.

One area where Noel jumps the track along the way is in describing Portland's early craft beer history:

By 1984 the city of fewer than four hundred thousand was home to a handful of breweries, including what would briefly become three of the nation's ten largest: Portland Brewing Co., Full Sail Brewing Co., and Widmer Brothers Brewing. Widmer, in particular, generated buzz with its odd choice of a flagship: hefeweizen...

Actually, Portland had only one operational brewery at the end of 1984. That was Bridgeport Brewing, known at the time as Columbia River Brewing. Portland Brewing didn't open until March 1986. Full Sail (originally Hood River Brewing) didn't open until 1987, and not in Portland; Widmer was prepping to open in 1984 and eventually did in April 1985. But Hefeweizen was not the Widmer Brothers intended flagship. That honor belonged to Altbier, which proved to be a hard sell. Hefeweizen became the Widmer flagship largely by accident a year or two after they officially opened.

Regardless of that misstep, Noel has put together an excellent book that will be of interest to craft beer fans and industry observers. I regard it as essential reading.

Goose Island's Awkward Stab at Relevance

Goose Island Brewing was established in 1988. It was a proud craft brand for more than two decades, respected in its hometown of Chicago and beyond. In 2011, it was consumed by Anheuser-Busch, a buyout that wasn't exactly welcomed by craft beer fans. Of course, there were many more buyouts to come.

For several years, Goose Island rode the wave of craft popularity. Heavily discounted kegs of Goose IPA sucked up tap handles in bars everywhere. Never mind that the great bulk of that beer was and is brewed in AB factory breweries or partner breweries. Goose was hot.

It's all gone sour, of course, Goose brands have been taking a dive in grocery and retail stores around the country. The only brand in growth mode is Goose IPA, up 29 percent last year. That number, mainly the result of discounting, is a fraction of the rate at which the IPA was growing several years ago.

Goose Island is caught in the same downward spiral we're seeing with many of the regional craft breweries. These folks are struggling, in good part because smaller, local brewers are better at innovation and producing what contemporary beer fans want. You need to be creative and nimble. Large breweries aren't.

Big beer failed to see the shift in tastes coming. When they started buying up craft breweries, they expected to dominate the marketplace via mass production and distribution of formerly independent brands. They've actually had some success with that. AB's High End portfolio has done well, largely due to the power of distribution and discounting.

But the number of small local breweries cropping up all over the map is a stick in big beer's spokes. The little guys have momentum. They're closely connected to their markets and many of them specialize in small batch, experimental beers that tap the hearts, minds and taste buds of local and regional consumers. This is the state of the industry, like it or not.

Adjusting to the changed reality is proving a steep challenge for big beer, which includes regional craft and the Baby Buds. Even though Goose Island has well-known specialty brands, its national status renders those brands less relevant to consumers. Its mainstream beers, widely considered to be pedestrian and out of touch, face declining appeal.

Addressing that challenge isn't as simple as installing a small batch brewery and making small batch beers. That's the easy part. The larger challenge is winning back status and credibility. That's tough. And breweries the size of Goose Island aren't that nimble, despite being bankrolled by their masters in St. Louis, Belgium or wherever.

Nonetheless, Goose Island hopes to remake its image. First thing on the agenda was a canning machine. You may have noticed that innovation beers often tend to come in 16-ounce cans these days. Goose noticed. It bought a tiny canning line and hopes to exploit the can fad by rolling out small batch, experimental beers in its home market. Blanks with label wraps, anyone?

There's also help on the way for Goose Island's specialty beers, including Matilda and Sofie, which are underperforming as consumers chase local options. They'll likely revamp the packaging with new bottles and labels. Because when beers aren't selling, it's almost always the packaging. Who was it that warned us about breweries that sell packaging, not beer? Hmmm.

It's worth mentioning that returning to local roots is a popular theme in big craft at the moment. It's popular because it's about the only option they have. Consider the case of Widmer, still waiting for a fat AB buyout check. It closed the Gasthaus Pub suddenly late last fall and promptly opened a taphouse featuring experimental, small batch beers. Shocking, eh?

Like Goose Island, Widmer has watched its brands collapse across a wide range of geography. Both would like craft fans to forget their national aspirations and connections to big beer. Both want to be seen as being all about experimentation and innovation. Both see building credibility at home as a means of lifting their struggling mainstream portfolios everywhere.

But it's hard to imagine Goose Island's mainstream beers rebounding nationally. Or Widmer's. The sheer number of small, local breweries has altered the landscape pretty much for good. Efforts to reclaim and build on local relevance look mostly like awkward stabs in the dark.

AB's Pricing Counteroffensive: The Sequel

Monday's post on Anheuser-Busch's latest effort to undermine the craft beer movement struck a chord with many readers, and also a few nerves. The story was shared on reddit.com and wound up getting hammered to the tune of more than 20K page views. Uncharted waters.

Since Monday, the Beer Business Daily has released some updated information on the rational behind the pricing strategy, as well as what's actually happening and what some industry people think about it.

The Angle
Anheuser-Busch has really nothing to lose with the $56 keg pricing in Washington and Oregon. Both are low share states for AB products. Plus, most of the volume sold as part of this promo is going through AB-owned distributors, which means they can spread the costs broadly. Very few independents are involved, as predicted.

With respect to brand equity damage, it may not happen. Many retailers will simply keep prices where they are and pocket the extra profit. If there's no discounting at the tap, consumers who don't read blogs like this one won't know what's going on and the brands involved (Shock Top and Goose Island) won't suffer any equity damage at all...beyond their affiliation with Anheuser-Busch.

As expected, the strategy is getting very little traction in craft-centric bars and pubs. These places aren't interested in offering marked down, marginal craft brands. Their customers would balk and walk. So most of the action is in mainstream accounts, which can make a few extra bucks selling stuff they already sell.

Risk for Craft
There are those in the industry, some quoted in BBD, who believe AB is testing the discounting strategy to see how many tap handles can be acquired. If successful, the strategy may be expanded. The way it becomes a problem for craft brewers is if AB is able to undercut pricing to the extent that retailers start demanding similar pricing from craft brewers.

Anheuser-Busch, if it wanted to, could broaden the effort by producing quality beer, which it could do at a fraction of what it costs craft brewers. That seems unlikely. Keep in mind that AB is not particularly good at brand building. Most of their strategic edge is wrapped up in efficiency. They are ruthless cost-cutters, not brand builders.

What they would likely do to expand the discounting campaign is acquire more craft brands. Once they have a controlling interest, they would dump that beer on the market at discounted prices as a means of pushing prices downward and sucking some of the profit out of craft beer. That's what they're doing with Goose Island and the strategy could be repeated.

In the end, any effort to undercut price will require time and coordination. Winning a few tap handles with cheap beer isn't going to do much, except maybe produce some local or regional price wars. For the strategy to work, AB will have to make a concerted longterm effort to undermine the profitability of craft beer. That's the risk for craft brewers, but you have to wonder if AB is up to it.

Goose Island
Some readers didn't like me lumping Goose Island with Shock Top. Oh well. The problem for Goose Island is that it is a wholly owned subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch. The once respected, independent brand is now nothing more than a pawn in AB's efforts to address declining market share. Right alongside the dreadful Shock Top.

Honestly, I've never had a Goose Island beer that was above average. The bulk of the Goose Island beer we see in Oregon is surely mass produced by AB. The highly sought-after Bourbon County Stout is rare and I haven't had it. However, I had their Illinois Imperial IPA last night a Belmont Station. This is not a standard issue Goose Island beer. It was okay, nothing more.

Happy Friday!

Anheuser-Busch's Latest Counteroffensive: Pricing

As craft beer continues to see growth, it's hardly a secret where the increased market share is coming from. Big beer's so-called premium brands continue to take a beating. As documented here and elsewhere, they aren't taking this situation laying down by any means. They want your money.

Indeed, big beer is working against the growth of craft beer in all kinds of creative and not-so-creative ways. They've gone in and manipulated laws in some states...or they've used loopholes in laws to their advantage. They're fighting against growlers in some states. In others, like Oregon, they're buying up distributors.

Then there's brand confusion, where big beer creates fake craft brands, which they then promote as the real thing via spendy marketing campaigns. The beers don't fool knowledgeable craft beer fans, but they do create enough brand confusion to reel in some new drinkers.

Now there's news that Anheuser-Busch, big beer's biggest bully, is launching a new counteroffensive based on price. The story was first reported in the Beer Business Daily the other day. I don't subscribe...too expensive. But I've received several messages from industry sources filling me in on what's happening.

It seems AB distributors in parts of Oregon and Washington (the reach of the campaign is uncertain) have issued updated price lists containing massive price drops on the Shock Top and Goose Island brands. Kegs that were previously selling to retailers for about $110 per half barrel will now be priced at $56. That's not a misprint. No word on pricing for packaged versions of those beers.

Inquiring minds may ask what AB is up to. Well, it appears they will attempt to use loss leader pricing to gain control of tap handles wherever possible. The low hanging fruit likely includes meat markets where the clientele often likes to drink a lot on the cheap. Buffalo Wild Wings and Blitz come instantly to mind, but they aren't alone. These joints could offer $3 pints of Shock Top or Goose Island around the clock and still make money.

What we clearly won't see is Shock Top or Goose Island taking over any handles at aficionado spots like Belmont Station, Saraveza or BeerMongers. Fat chance. The buyers in those bars would rather have their blood drained by vampires than serve charlatan craft brands to customers. It's not gonna happen...though I do like the juxtaposition of vampires and Anheuser-Busch.

Then there's the distributor angle. How could a distributor offer pricing like this? Even with backdoor subsidies in the form of reduced prices, discounts on shipping or increased advertising support, this kind of pricing would put independent distributors in a bind. Of course, many, possibly most of the distributors offering this pricing are wholly owned by Anheuser-Busch. They have to sell this sludge no matter what. So much for the three-tier system.

There is definitely some consternation on the part of MillerCoors distributors, who are independently owned and generally more interested in growing craft brands than in collapsing them, like AB. They wonder what predatory pricing on Shock Top and Goose Island will do to gateway brands like Blue Moon and Third Shift. They don't want a price war. But maybe that's what they have for now.

Look, the obvious goal of AB's initiative is to gobble up as many tap handles in as many places as possible. It's a rear guard action. These handles are apt to be in joints frequented by a lot of gateway drinkers. Hardcore craft bars aren't good targets. Once they have the business, prices of Shock Top and Goose Island will gradually increase.

It's a cynical strategy. What did you expect? It's your money they're after. That's what they've always been after. All that's changed is they've lost control of the narrative.